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ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, victims of crime are indicating their dissatisfaction with what 
they perceive to be a marginalised role in the criminal justice process. 
Although, to a limited extent, the concept of accountability to victims is 
acknowledged within the process, the various types of acknowledgement 
are the subject of diverse criticisms by victims. One common criticism is 
that these types of acknowledgement fail to afford victims a participatory 
role in the criminal justice process. 
Accordingly, the paper asks, first, whether an appropriate place to offer 
such a role might be at sentencing, and, secondly, considers the effect of a 
provision of enforceable rights within the criminal Justice process for victims 
to participate in sentencing. Evaluation of these proposals reveals that it is 
unlikely that a satisfactory outcome can be attained by promulgating victim 
participation in sentencing because the probable outcomes of such 
participation are likely to conflict with the sentencing aims of the criminal 
Justice process. The paper concludes that effective participation by victims 
will be attained only within a restorative justice process, and proposes that 
a restorative justice process should replace the criminal justice process at 
the point of sentencing 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 12,650 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an upsurge of support for victims of crime. 
As a result of an increasing interest in victims as a focus of academic 
research, and also as the inspiration for a growing number of national 
support groups, " .... the victim has moved from being a 'forgotten actor' to 
key player in the criminal justice process."
1 Much of this interest 
concentrates upon the desirability of victims receiving certain services, 
(exemplified in New Zealand by the principles set out in the Victims of 
Offences Act 1987). However, there is also the question of whether victims 
should now assume a more active and indeed participatory role within 
aspects of the criminal justice process itself. Research has identified the 
issue of increased participation in the criminal justice process as being 
something which would assist in " .. restoring a victim of crime's sense of 
self-worth and enable them to get on with their life".
2 Accordingly, this 
paper asks whether a participatory role for the victim should be 
promulgated within one particular area of the criminal justice process, 
namely the sentencing of the offender. Current practice in European legal 
systems3 and, to a more limited extent, in the United States,
4 suggests that 
New Zealand should not dismiss this proposal. Indeed, the logical stage at 
which to promote victim participation within the criminal justice process is at 
1 L Zedner "Victims" in M Maguire, R Morgan, R Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology (2 ed) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 577. 
2 A Lee, W Searle Victims ' Needs: An Issues Paper (Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1993) 9. 
3 See E Erez, E Bienkowska "Victim Participation in Proceedings and Satisfaction 
with Justice in the Continental Systems: The Case of Poland" (1993] 21 Journal of 
Criminal Justice 48. 
4 See SA Cellini "Proposed Victim Rights Amendments to the US Constitution" 
(1997) 14 Ariz. J. lnt'I & Comp. Law 837, 855. 
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sentencing.5 "It is when we know we have an offender, not just a 
defendant, that the victim is most strongly entitled to be heard" .
6 
The Ministry of Justice has presented five arguments for the proposition 
that victims should be offered the opportunity to express his or her views 
concerning the sentencing of an offender.
7 They are that such a move 
would show the wider community that the state recognises the personal 
involvement of the individual victim; that it would create for the victim a 
balance with the rights which are already accorded to the offender;
8 that it 
would assist victims to come to terms with their trauma; that facing the 
victim might promote the rehabilitation of the offender; and that it might 
reduce the use of imprisonment in sentencing since victims are more likely 
to seek and be satisfied with a sentence of reparation, particularly if the 
offender shows remorse. 
However, an important issue of principle arises from the proposal that 
victims should participate in the sentencing process. That is, whether such 
a proposal is reconcilable with " .. the nature and goals of the criminal justice 
process as a legal and social institution" .
9 This issue encompasses others, 
such as possible conflict with the aims of sentencing within the criminal 
justice process, the relevance or otherwise of the individual characteristics 
of a particular victim to the sentencing of the offender, the requirement for 
5 G Davies Making Amends. Mediation and Reparation in Criminal Justice 
(Routledge, London , 1992) 71 . See also New Zealand Law Commission Criminal 
Prosecution - Preliminary Paper No 28 (Wellington, 1997) 79. 
6 SJ Schulhofer "The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us" (1995) 105 The Yale 
Law Journal 825. See also G Davies above n 5, 27. 
7 Ministry of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance: A Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, November 1997), 125. 
8 le rights which allow the offender to present their circumstances for consideration 
in pre-sentence reports, and also to call witnesses concerning their cultural 
background and its effect upon the offending (Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 16). 
9 A Ashworth "Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing" [1993] Crim . L. R. 498. 
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consistency in sentencing, and also whether victims themselves would find 
such participation to be adequate to meet their needs. 
Research shows that existing provisions which acknowledge the role of the 
victim, such as the ability of a victim to participate in the preparation of a 
victim impact statement, and to receive restitutional and compensatory 
awards from the court, do not necessarily increase victim satisfaction with 
the criminal justice process. Accordingly , the provision of legally 
enforceable rights within the criminal justice process for the victim to 
participate in sentencing is considered as an option. However, there is 
evidence from other jurisdictions that increasing the actively participatory 
role of the victim in the sentencing process might not in fact increase victim 
satisfaction to any great extent. 
1° Furthermore the participation of victims, if 
given any real recognition by the sentencing court , is likely to result in 
sentencing outcomes which are very different from the aims of sentencing 
in the criminal justice process. The paper concludes that the suggested 
offender v victim paradigm is untenable within the existing criminal justice 
process. However, although the attempt to reconcile the retributive aims of 
the criminal justice process with the rehab ilitative aims of the restorative 
process may be futile , a substitution of the restorative process for the 
criminal justice process at the stage of sentencing might succeed. 
Therefore , the paper proposes that increased victim participation in 
sentencing be achieved by a change in the existing paradigm at 
sentencing . 
Part II of the paper outlines briefly the emergence of the criminal law as a 
system of "public wrongs" exemplified by a diminution in the role and status 
of the victim. The aims of the sentencing process have shown a similar 
change . The traditional ideal of compensatory redress from the offender to 
10 Above n 3. 
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the victim has now been replaced by the view that it is the state that 
requires to be avenged. 
11 
However, the concept of a degree of accountability to the victim is 
persuasive. Conceding to pressure from the United Nations 
12 and from 
victims' support groups, the New Zealand legislature has made some 
efforts to acknowledge the interest of victims in the criminal justice process. 
Parts Ill and IV of the paper review and critique , respectively, the 
sentencing provisions and other compensatory provisions which 
acknowledge accountability to the victim. It finds that although well-
intentioned, in practice these provisions have failed to deliver their 
promised benefits to victims. Furthermore , although acknowledging 
accountability to the victim , the provisions tend to offer him or her a passive 
role within the process. 
Part V reviews the theoretical and practicable arguments for allowing 
increased victim participation in sentencing within the criminal justice 
process. It concludes that by failing to acknowledge victims as having any 
significant role to play other than as witnesses for the prosecution , the 
criminal justice process itself prevents the development of a truly 
participatory sentencing process. 
Accordingly, Part VI considers whether a means of giving victims a sense 
of participation might be effected by providing victims with legally 
enforceable rights to participate in various ways in the sentencing process. 
Victims would then join the state and the offender as "key players" in the 
criminal justice process. However, a discussion of the form that such 
11 See, for example, A Koskela "Victim 's Rights Amendments: an Irresistible 
Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System" (1997) 34 Idaho Law 
Review 157, 178. 
12 United Nations Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power, 1985. 
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participation might take leads to the conclusion that the procedural and 
practical difficulties of this proposal are prohibitive . In addition, the ~onflict 
between the sentencing aims of victims and those of the criminal justice 
process is likely to encourage the use of judicial discretion to minimise the 
participatory role of the victim in the sentencing outcome . 
An alternative proposal is to limit the traditional state v offender model of 
the process to " .. one end of a continuum of practices by which social order 
is maintained". 13 Part VII hypothesises the development of a restorative 
justice process to replace the criminal justice process after a guilty verdict 
has been obtained (or pleaded). Restorative justice views crime as a 
conflict between individuals. Accordingly it both acknowledges the rights of 
the victim and also seeks his or her active participation. The views which 
have been expressed by victims concerning the existing restorative justice 
system of family group conferences are examined briefly. Research 
suggests that the reason for the lack of positive impact upon victims might 
be that any attempt to graft restorative justice principles onto the criminal 
justice process is bound to fail because of the inherent conflict between 
society's expectations of criminal justice, and the desired outcomes of 
restorative justice.
14 However if restorative justice were to replace the 
criminal justice state v offender paradigm entirely, rather than confining its 
main field of operation to the area of youth justice, society might be 
persuaded to accept it as a viable alternative. 
13 L Zedner "Reparation and Retribution : Are They Reconcilable?" (1994) 57 The 
Modern Law Review 228, 250. 
14 J Hudson, B Galaway (eds) Restorative Justice: International Perspectives 
(Kugler Publications, Amsterdam , 1996) 2; H Zehr Changing Lenses: A New Focus 
for Crime and Justice (Herald Press, Pennsylvania , 1990) 82. See also Submission 
No 73, Dunstall Restorative Justice: The Public Submissions (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington , 1998) . 
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The paper concludes, therefore, that a satisfactory outcome for victims 
might be obtained if a compromise is sought. The existing criminal justice 
process should continue in its present form up to the stage of sentencing, 
and should then (when the defendant has become an offender), 
15 be 
replaced by a restorative justice process. 
II THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
A The Emergence of the Criminal Justice Process 
The distinction between civil and criminal law is that criminal law is 
considered to be a public wrong , consisting of wrongdoing which is 
believed to threaten the security and well-being of society. Although any 
member of society may bring a criminal prosecution (whether or not they 
have suffered any direct harm themselves as a result of the offence), they 
may not discontinue it at will, 
16 for it is not only their concern but that of 
every citizen. 17 More commonly, the police, as representatives of the state, 
will instigate prosecution. The end result of a criminal prosecution is a 
criminal penalty, which is intended to be punitive in nature, and more 
significantly, to include an element of public denunciation of the crime.
18 It 
is this latter element which comprises the truly distinguishing feature from 
civil law, which consists of private wrongs. In civil proceedings the plaintiff 
is the person directly affected by the defendant's actions, and the end 
result will be an order for damages, which may include punitive or 
exemplary damages. However there is no element of public denunciation. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff may decline to enforce the order against the 
15 Above n 6. 
16 Wood (1832) 3 B & Ad 657. 
17 JC Smith Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law (8 ed) (Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd , London, 
1996) 17. 
18 Above n 7, 22. 
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defendant. In contrast, the victim of a criminal offence is not able to pardon 
the offender. 
Historically, however, little distinction was made between public and private 
wrongs. After analysis of early Roman, Hebrew and Greek legal systems, 
and biblical doctrine, Bianchi
19 asserts that the present punitive criminal 
system is based on a "historical misunderstanding generated by religious 
anachronism". The earlier forms of conflict resolution in Europe, following 
the ancient legal traditions, comprised a civil system of repair, 
compensation and dispute settlement.
20 Both victim and offender were key 
figures in these early legal systems, with the victim initiating proceedings 
in both civil and criminal matters. The court official performed a mediatory 
role and might order restitution, retributive punishment, or both.
21 By the 
sixteenth century, however, state control over punishment had usurped the 
role of the victim, probably, it is thought " .. to gain access to a source of 
revenue", and although the victim's role in initiating prosecutions remained 
in place , the rights of victims came to be regarded as independent of 
criminal law. 22 Early criminal law was based on the common law of felony, 
which comprised offences of violence and of property.
23 Felonies were 
deliberate acts (the mens rea of criminal law) and were therefore 
considered to be morally reprehensible. The early medieval ordeal placed 
19 H Bianchi Justice as Sanctuary: Toward a New System of Crime Control (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994) 31 . 
20 Above n 19, 16. See also G Davies above n 5; J Jamieson Crime, Victims and 
Justice (Strategic Leadership Network, Wellington , 1994) 3; and H Zehr "Rethinking 
Criminal Justice: Restorative Justice" in McElrea (ed) Re-Thinking Criminal Justice: 
Justice in the Community Vol I (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland , 1995) 11 . 
21 G Davies above n 5, 2. 
22 Above n 19, 66. 
23 CB Herrup The Common Peace: Participation and the Criminal Law in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) 2. 
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the felonious offender in the hands of God, although His influence was 
subsequently replaced by the trial by jury . However:
24 
Because criminal acts threatened th e peace of soc iety, criminal j usti cc 
could not simpl y be the co ncern of victims or the ir famili es .. ..... .... The 
injury in crime transcended the loss or an y single indi vidual. It was the 
king who stood as sy mboli c victim. and who had to be revenged . 
It is from this model that the criminal justice process developed, with its 
view of crime as an offence against society. The punishment for that 
offence is sought by the state as symbolic plaintiff , while the true plaintiff , 
the victim of the offence , is thereby ignored or at least marginalised in the 
ensuing court proceedings.
25 
However, the emergence of victims' movements in the past twenty years 
has led to arguments for a return to the ancient legal traditions according to 
which crime should be seen not only as a wrong against society but also as 
a dispute between offender and victim requiring resolution.
26 The following 
sections of this paper will consider whether a logical stage for the returning 
of victims to "their" conflict
27 is at the stage of sentencing and whether this 
proposal is practicable within the criminal justice process. 
B Sentencing Policies in the Criminal Justice Process 
Before addressing the question of whether vict ims should be involved in 
sentencing, it is necessary to examine the principles which underlie 
sentencing policies within the criminal justice process. For, according to 
Ashworth, it is the " .. nature and goals of the criminal justice process as a 
legal and social institution" and not the wishes of victims , which should 
24 Above n 23, 3. 
25 G Davies above n 5, 6. See also E Erez "Victim Participation in Sentencing : 
Rhetoric and Reality" (1990) 18 Journal of Criminal Justice 19. 
26 See text at n 21 . 
27 N Christie "Conflicts as Property" (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1. 
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dictate whether victims should have a right to be consulted or to participate 
in the criminal justice process.
28 
The various goals of the state when sentencing offenders have been 
summarised as: "just deserts" (retribution and denunciation), deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution.
29 Any one or more of these 
goals may be discerned in a particular sentencing decision. However, the 
goals themselves have evolved from three very different principles which 
underlie sentencing policies . 
One principle of sentencing, which aligns itself firmly with the state v 
offender criminal justice process, perceives sentencing as a means both 
for the assertion of state authority and also for deterrence. This principle 
underlies the retribution goal, in which the focus is on the offence itself. 
Because a criminal offence is regarded by the courts as a moral wrong, 
sentencing should involve the imposition by the state of some form of 
punishment on the offender. The same principle also underlies, to some 
extent, the deterrence goal, according to which public denunciation of the 
offender is considered to be part of the punishment. Under this principle, 
proportionality of sentencing, related to the offence itself, is targeted. In 
other words, the severity of the offence should dictate the level of 
punishment, and like offences should attract like sentences.
30 
Proportionality of sentencing is seen as both inspiring public confidence 
and achieving fairness amongst defendants.
31 No attempt is made to 
prevent recidivism or to compensate the victim, because it is believed that 
neither of these goals relate to the underlying principle. 
28 Above n 9, 499. 
29 Above n 7, 37. 
30 Above n 7, 40. 
31 D Miers "The Responsibility and Rights of Victims of Crime" (1992) 55 The 
Modern Law Review 482, cited in Ashworth , above n 9, 503. 
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A second principle of sentencing perceives it as being a means for the 
achievement of a greater social good by the reduction of crime . This 
utilitarian principle underlies the deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation goals of sentencing .
32 The aim of this principle is to deter 
future offending and to protect society from future offending. To a limited 
extent, therefore , this principle considers and protects potential victims.
33 
However, because the focus remains upon the state and the offender, this 
principle is not entirely incompatible with the state v offender criminal 
justice process. Nevertheless, because it necessarily permits a 
consideration of past offending to be used as a predictor of likely future 
behaviour, and also because the rehabilitative requirements of any 
offender require a subjective judgment, the proportionality of sentencing 
which is considered essential to the state v offender criminal justice 
process is supplanted by a wide disparity in sentencing under this principle . 
A third principle sees sentencing as being a means of making redress to 
the victim . This principle underlies the use of restitution as a sentencing 
goal and is recognised in the sentence of reparation which is provided for 
by the Criminal Justice Act 1985. There is a fundamental difference 
between restitution and the other sentencing goal, because restitution is 
focused mainly on the victim rather than the offender.
34 A logical extension 
of this principle of sentencing is that the wishes of the victim should be 
influential, so that if the victim wishes to forgive the offender then no 
sentencing order should be made.
35 
It is apparent that only the first of these sentencing principles sits 
comfortably with the state v offender criminal justice process. The latter two 
32 Above n 7, 37. 
33 Above n 7, 57. 
34 Above n 7, 78. 
35 Above n 9, 503. 
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principles conflict with the process to a greater or lesser degree. One of the 
reasons for this conflict might be that these two principles of sentencing 
require an acknowledgement of the victim as a participant in the 
sentencing process, whereas the victim is not acknowledged as a 
participant in the criminal justice process itself. 
Yet victims' rights groups now demand this acknowledgement. The 
importance of sentencing to victims is discussed by Cretney et al
36 who 
explain that "[t]he sentence imposed is ... regarded by victims as a 
yardstick of their own worth in the eyes of the court". The authors note the 
dismay felt by victims faced with supposedly inadequate sentences and 
emphasise that sentencers are pursuing "primarily 'public ' purposes". Thus 
any "justification" put forward by a judge for a particular sentence will 
generally be addressed to the public and not to the victim of the offence. 
However, the authors question the popular view that more compensatory 
sentencing will necessarily reduce the role of the state in the criminal 
justice process. They warn that the sentencing process might still retain its 
essentially public character and, also, that compensatory sentencing might 
not necessarily satisfy the many victims who have non-pecuniary motives 
for reporting offences to the police.
37 With these comments in mind, the 
following two sections of the paper consider and critique existing specific 
policies in New Zealand which purport to acknowledge the wrong which 
has been done to a victim of crime . 
36 A Cretney, G Davis , C Clarkson, J Shepherd "Criminalizing Assault: The Failure 
of the 'Offence Against Society' Model" [1994] 34 British Journal of Criminology 15, 
24. 
37 Above n 36. 
-14-
Ill ACCOUNTABILITY TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 
Despite the lack of theoretical foundation for acknowledging the victim 
within the criminal justice process, the concept of the victim of a crime as 
being one to whom certain responsibilities are owed by the state and the 
offender is becoming more apparent.
38 To this end , legislative provision 
has been made for the views of victims of crime to be taken into account by 
a sentencing judge, and also for victims of crime to receive certain forms of 
compensation . The provisions are as follows: 
• The Victims of Offences Act 1987, which provides for victim impact 
statements; 
• The Criminal Justice Act 1985, which provides for reparation, 
compensation and restitution for victims, and allows the court to take 
account of an offer made by the offender to make amends; and 
• The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992, which 
provides for compensation for victims of violent crimes . 
There is also the possibility, which has always existed , of a victim bringing 
proceedings in civil law for tortious damages from the offender. 
A The Victim Impact Statement 
Section 8 of the Victims of Offences Act 1987 provides for victim impact 
statements. In accordance with the persuasive (as opposed to legally 
enforceable) nature of the Act , the section states as follows: 
38 For example the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (November 1985) is binding on New Zealand 
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( I ) Appropriate admini strati ve arrangements sh ould be made to 
ensure that a -;e ntenei ng .Judge is in forrncd about an y ph ys ical or 
emoti onal harm. or any loss of or darnage to property, suffered by 
the victim th rough or by means or the offence, and an y other 
effec ts of the offence on the victim . 
(2) Any such in formati on should be conveyed to the Judge either by 
the prosecutor orall y or by means or a written statement about the 
victim ... 
Two further subsections were inserted in July 1994. These provide , in 
effect, that the sentencing Judge may direct a prosecutor to provide the 
information mentioned above in relation to any victim . 
The "lack of specificity"39
 of the legislation has led to the formulation of 
judicial principles concerning victim impact statements (V.1.S.). In Sargeant 
v Po!ice,40 Hammond J advised that a V.I.S. should serve at least four 
S 41 purposes . The V.I. .: 
ii 
iii 
iv 
assists the court with further information . 
provides the Court with information about the effect of a 
crime on a victim and helps to balance the information in the 
pre-sentence report on the offender. 
affords the victim input into the administration of justice. 
forces the offender to recognise what he or she has done, 
which may advance the rehabilitative process and prevent 
further offending. 
39 G Hall "Victim Impact Statements: Sentencing on Thin Ice?" (1992) 15 NZ 
Universities Law Review 143. 
40 (1997) 15 CRNZ 454. 
41 Above n 40, 456. 
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Section 8(2) of the Victims of Offences Act provides for an oral or written 
V.I.S. to be conveyed to the judge by the prosecutor. The Act does not 
specifically permit the victim himself to make an oral statement, possibly 
because a written statement is perceived as less overtly influential upon the 
court than an oral statement by the victim.
42 The V.I.S. therefore offers a 
relatively low key means of satisfying the popular demand to include 
victims within the criminal justice process, while, at the same time, 
preserving tradition , which requires unfettered judicial discretion in the 
sentencing process. That this approach need not automatically be 
discredited has been confirmed by studies which conclude that a sense of 
participation (whether this participation has actually influenced the 
sentencing process, or not), is important to victims.
43 
B Reparation 
The sentence of reparation is compensatory in nature, but is of broader 
scope than compensation per se . Thus, as well as the compensatory aim, 
the other main aims of reparation are " .. to increase opportunities for the 
development of offender awareness of the consequences of their offences, 
and to reduce imprisonment for property offending".
44 Reparation requires 
an offender to make amends for the wrong caused to the victim . 
Although reparation was originally believed to be a suitable sentence only 
for property related offences, it is now, in theory at least, much more widely 
available. Indeed, since 1993 the Criminal Justice Act 1985 has provided 
for reparation to be considered in all cases. Section 11 states as follows: 
The Court shall consider imposi ng a sente nce of reparation in eve ry 
case, and . subject to sect ion 22 of this Act shall impose such a 
42 Davis RC, Smith BE "Victim Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction: An 
Unfulfilled Promise?" [1994] 22 Journal of Criminal Justice 1, 11 . 
43 Above n 42, 2. 
44 Policy and Research Division , Dept of Justice "The Impact on Sentencing of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985" (Dept of Justice, Wellington , Sept 1988) 150. 
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sentence unless it i~ ~atisfied that it would be clearly inappropriate to 
do so.~~ 
Although the Act does not state when it would be "clearly inappropriate" to 
make a reparation order, one ground would be that such an order would be 
clearly beyond the foreseeable means of the offender.
46 
Section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act provides that an offender may be 
sentenced to make reparation whenever the court is satisfied that any other 
person suffered either emotional harm, or any loss of or damage to 
property, through or by means of the offence. However, there must be a 
causal connection between the offence and the loss, damage or emotional 
harm suffered by the victim. The issue is whether a reasonable person 
could have foreseen the kind of damage which occurred as a result of the 
offence.47 
Section 22 requires the sentencing court to give the prosecution and 
defence an opportunity to be heard on the specific question of reparation, 
as well as hearing the general submissions on sentencing. Unless the 
amount of reparation will clearly not exceed the sum of $500, a probation 
officer may be ordered to prepare a report on the financial means and 
existing financial obligations of the offender, the value of the loss or 
damage, and the frequency and magnitude of payments which should be 
made by the offender.
48 The probation officer is required to attempt to seek 
agreement between the offender and the person who suffered emotional 
45 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 11 (as substituted by the Criminal Amendment Act 
1993, s 4) . 
46 Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker's Limited , Wellington, 1998) Ch 3.5.13 . 
47 See Wilson v Police Unreported, 13 February 1995, High Court, Napier Registry, 
AP 60/94, cited in Adams on Criminal Law above n 46, Ch3.3.02 para (1 ). 
48 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22. 
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harm, or any loss of or damage to property, on the amount the offender 
should be required to pay by way of reparation.
49 
Amendments made in 1993 to the Criminal Justice Act require the court to 
direct that reparation ordered under the provisions of s 22(1) be made in 
part, or by means of periodic payments, where the offender has insufficient 
means to make reparation in full,
50 and to sentence the offender to 
reparation in preference to a fine, where the offender has insufficient 
means to pay both.
51 Where a sentence of a fine has been imposed in 
addition to a sentence of reparation, any payment received from the 
offender must first be applied in satisfaction of the amount due under the 
sentence of reparation.
52 Reparation may be imposed concurrently with a 
fine , and either a community based sentence or a custodial sentence. 
However, a 1997 study concluded that the 1993 amendments to the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 have had little effect on the use of the sentence 
of reparation, " ... probably because the amendments mainly confirmed 
actions which were already being taken."
53 
C Compensation 
Section 28 requires the court to consider whether any part of a fine ordered 
to be paid by an offender should be ordered to be paid to a victim by way of 
49 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 23. However the section provides further that the 
person who suffered either emotional harm, or any loss of or damage to property, 
shall not be obliged to meet the offender. 
5° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22(6) (as inserted by the Criminal Amendment Act 
1993, s 8(2)) . 
51 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22(7) (as inserted by the Criminal Amendment Act 
1993, s 8(2)). 
52 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22(8) (as inserted by the Criminal Amendment Act 
1993, s 8(2)), and see Bowman v Police (1993) 10 CRNZ 558. 
53 P Spier Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand (Ministry of 
Justice, Wellington, Nov. 1997) 157. 
-19-
compensation, where that victim has suffered physical or emotional harm 
as a result of the offence. The court must first determine whether a fine is 
appropriate by reference to the offence itself, since s 28 may not be used 
to provide compensation to a victim of an offence for which a fine is not 
justified. Thus, the operation of s 28 is effectively excluded for the victim of 
a serious offence which merits a sentence of imprisonment. Furthermore, 
the level of fine and therefore the level of compensation will be dictated by 
the offender's means. Any such compensatory award must be deducted 
from any damages recovered by the victim as a result of a civil action. 
However an award of compensation under s 28 of the Criminal Justice Act 
does not affect the victim's right to receive compensation under the 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992. 
D Restitution 
Restitution involves the return of property which is in the wrongful 
possession of an offender to its rightful owner. Section 404 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 provides for a restitution order to be made by the court in 
such circumstances. An order for restitution may be made when 
discharging an offender, whereas an order for reparation may be made 
only following a conviction.
54 
E An Offer to make Amends 
Section 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 provides that the court may 
take into account any offer of compensation made by or on behalf of the 
offender to the victim, and may adjourn sentencing pending the payment of 
compensation. In deciding whether and to what extent an offer of 
compensation should be taken into account under this provision, the court 
may have regard to whether or not the offer has been accepted by the 
54 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 19(3), 20 and Adams on Criminal Law above n 46, 
CA 347.07. 
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victim as expiating or mitigating the wrong . The provision is restorative in 
nature and might be expected to receive strong approval from victims. 
However, at the time of writing , the precise effect of the victim 's attitude to 
the offer of amends has not been considered in any reported case. ss 
F Compensation under the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 1992 
The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 provides a "no-
fault" compensation scheme for compensation for personal injury by 
accident. A victim of crime who suffers physical injury (and mental injury if it 
is consequent upon that physical injury) is entitled to various forms of 
compensation from the scheme. Victims of certain sexual crimes are 
entitled to claim for mental consequences alone. Victims of other crimes, 
who suffer severe psychological damage but who do not incur physical 
damage, receive nothing under the scheme.s
6 
State funded compensation is justified on several grounds. In particular, 
that it reflects the existence of a "contract" between the state and its 
citizens, whereby in consideration of individual citizens relinquishing their 
"rights" in any criminal dispute, the state promises to compensate them for 
any injury suffered, that the state has failed in its duty to prevent the crime 
and so has a moral obligation to compensate the victim, that welfare 
principles and the appeasement of community outrage merit compensation 
to those who have suffered hardship occasioned by criminal violence.s
7 
55 Above n 46, Ch3.5.14. 
56 For further discussion see R Tobin "Compensation for Victims of Crime Here and 
Overseas" in Seminar Proceedings The Victim and the Criminal Justice System: 
Past Progress and Future Plans (Victims Task Force, Well ington, 1992) 106. 
57 Community Law Reform Committee of the Australian Capital Territory Criminal 
lnjuriesCompensation(http:\\actag.canberra.edu.au/actag.Reports/CLRC/R6/Report 
6c5.html). 
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G Civil Proceedings 
Both the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and the Crimes Act 1961 preserve the 
right to pursue a civil remedy for exemplary damages arising from the 
same conduct for which an offender has been convicted in criminal 
proceedings. 58 However, a 1995 survey of judges concerning the issue of 
reparation, found that judges frequently considered civil remedies to be a 
viable option for victims of offences against the person and when a fine 
rather than reparation might be imposed.
59 The judges viewed the right for 
a victim to bring civil proceedings as offering a preferable alternative to 
receiving reparation from the criminal court, since the existence of a 
reparation order was considered to present an impediment to a civil action 
for damages. 
IV ACCOUNTABILITY PROVISIONS: A VICTIM'S 
CRITIQUE 
A The Victim Impact Statement 
1 Lack of participation 
Research has suggested that, for those victims who wish to be involved in 
the criminal justice process, an actively participatory role is sought.
60 The 
submission of a written V.I.S. to the sentencing judge does not fulfil this 
role. Indeed, research carried out in the United States concluded that the 
58 See the Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 24(f) , 28(4) and the Crimes Act 1961, ss 
10(4), 405. See also O v U (1996) 14 CRNZ 76 which affirmed that the right to bring 
civil proceedings is not invalidated by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 
26(2). 
59 Above n 44, 152. 
60 Above n 2. 
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fact that a V.I.S. has been completed has no significant effect on victim 
satisfaction. 61 
An earlier study had suggested that one possible reason for the lack of 
victim satisfaction might be the lack of ceremony attached to V.I.S. 
interviews - often the victims were not aware that one of the purposes, or 
indeed the only purpose , of an interview was to produce a V.I.S. In order to 
negate this possible effect in the 1994 research , every effort was made to 
ensure that the victims who were to be the subjects of the study were 
aware of the purpose of the V.I.S. interview. The researchers were able to 
select the court staff who would carry out the interviews, and train them to 
conduct the interviews in an empathic fashion and to emphasise to the 
victims the reasons why the questions were being asked. The victims, who 
were victims of serious offences of robbery , felonious assault, attempted 
homicide , or burglary, were assigned randomly to one of three groups. 
Within the first group of victims, each victim was interviewed, a V.I.S. was 
written and distributed, and the victims were told that the judge would have 
the V.I.S . available at sentencing. The victims were also told that a person 
from Victim Services Agency would contact them one month after the 
court hearing to ask them what com ing to court had been like and to 
update the information in their V.I.S. if necessary. When the victims' cases 
ended the researchers would contact them to find out what they felt about 
the case outcome. 
A second group of victims was interviewed but no written V.I.S. was 
produced. This was to establish whether the victim impact interview alone 
had a therapeutic influence upon victim satisfaction. These victims were 
told that the Victim Services Agency and the researchers were interested in 
61 Above n 43, 10. 
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learning about the experiences of crime victims and the effect of the crime 
upon their lives. The victims were also told that a person from Victim 
Services Agency would contact them one month after the court hearing to 
ask them what coming to court had been like . When the victims' cases 
ended the researchers would contact them to find out what they felt about 
the case outcome. 
Finally, a control group of victims was simply informed that Victim Services 
Agency was interested in learning about the experiences of crime victims 
and that someone from the Agency would contact them one month after 
the court hearing to ask them what coming to court was like , and again to 
enquire what they felt about the case outcome . 
Analysis of responses obtained from the three groups of victims during the 
first interview (one month after the hearing) , and the second interview (after 
the disposition of the case), led the researchers to conclude that not only 
did the production of a V.1.S. not increase victim satisfaction with the 
criminal justice system , but also that about half of the victims who received 
the experimental treatment did not remember it. Yet as the authors point 
out: s2 
.. . the treatment we des igned and implemented in the present study was 
more di stinct and meaningful to victims th an 1110 t impact statement 
procedures currentl y in use in court s ac ross the Uni ted States. 
This research has implications for New Zealand. Hall observes that the 
victim of an offence will often not be asked directly how the offending has 
affected him or her and indeed might not be aware that the V.I.S. is being 
prepared from the statements made to the police off icer at the time of the 
offence .63 
62 Above n 43, 11 . 
63 Above n 39, 153. The position is similar in Australia, see E Erez, L Roeger, F 
Morgan "Victim Impact Statements in South Au stra lia: An Evaluation" (Office of 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTOR/A UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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2 Lack of skilled preparation 
Although there are reports of some victims being advised to complete the 
V.1.S. themselves,
64 more commonly the V.I.S. will be prepared by the 
police officer who attends the scene of the offence. The role of the police in 
preparing the V.I.S . has been criticised on the basis that the police do not 
have the time to spend with the victim , that they do not have the necessary 
skills , and that the statements they prepare are often too brief and limited.
65 
3 Lack of real influence 
Certain states in the United States have legislated for the V.I .S. to contain 
an expression of opinion on sentence.
66 However, the V.I.S . in New 
Zealand serves only to inform the judge of the effect of the offence upon 
the victim. Although, the V.I.S . is not intended to be used as a means of 
suggesting a sentence to the sentencing judge which the victim might 
consider to be appropriate for the offender,
67 nevertheless, a 1989 survey 
established that a majority of judges thought that the V.I.S. should have 
some effect on sentencing.
68 However, since the V.I .S. is not intended to 
be directed towards a reparatory sentence as such , the concept of "an 
effect on sentencing" is somewhat nebulous and therefore unsatisfactory 
from a victim's point of view. For instance, it is not possible for a victim to 
assess with any certainty whether or not the V.I.S. actually had any effect 
upon the sentence eventually imposed on the offender. 
Crime Statistics , South Australian Attorney-General 's Department, Adelaide , 1994) 
20. 
64 Above n 2, 16. See also R v J Unreported , 22 November 1994, High Court, 
Rotorua Registry, T 35/94. Noted 18 TCL 5/6. 
65 Above n 2, 11 . These criticisms have also been made by the judiciary, see B 
Galaway, P Spier Sentencing to Reparation: Implementation of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1985 (Policy and Research Division , Dept of Justice , Well ington, 1992) 109. 
66 Above n 9, 504. 
67 See Lowe v Police (1988) 3 CRNZ 199, and R v Hopkirk (1994) 12 CRNZ 216. 
68 B Galaway, P Spier, above n 65. 
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Hall concludes that the V.I .S. is simply one factor among many to be taken 
into account by the court " .. when exercising its discretion and weighing 
matters that may be seen to aggravate or mitigate sentence."
69 The 
decision in Lowe v Police
70 affirms this view. In Lowe the offender's appeal 
was successful on the grounds that too much emphasis had been placed 
by the sentencing Court on the V.I.S., to the exclusion of other relevant 
factors. The offender in Lowe had been convicted of causing death by 
dangerous driving and disqualified from driving for two years. He had 
requested the Judge in the District Court to grant him a limited driving 
licence in order that he might continue his paid employment, but this was 
refused because a V.I.S. had stated that the family of the deceased would 
be distraught if they saw him driving. In the High Court, Holland J allowed 
the appeal, affirming that sentencing must remain the responsibility of the 
Court, which must take into account all the circumstances of the offence 
and the offender. Although the damage and harm caused by the offence 
upon the victim is one such circumstance, the Victims of Offences Act 1987 
was not intended by Parliament to enable the Courts to surrender their 
responsibility to impose an appropriate sentence.
71 
The use of emotive language in a V.1.S . to describe the particular 
characteristics of the victim has also been criticised, although in Payne v 
Tennessee72 the Supreme Court of the United States observed the 
injustice of permitting the defendant to introduce evidence in mitigation 
relating to previous good character at the sentencing hearing and noted 
69 Above n 39, 157. 
70 (1988) 3 CRNZ 199. 
71 Above n 70, 202. 
72 Payne v Tennessee 112 L Ed 2d 1032, 111 S Ct 1407 (1991 ), discussed in E A 
Meek "Victim Impact Evidence and Capital Sentencing : A Casenote on Payne v 
Tennessee" (1992) 52 Louisiana Law Review 1299. See also State v Gentry 88 P 
2d 1105 (Wash. 1995) and State v Muhammad 678 A 2d 164 (N .J. 1996). 
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that the surviving victim should similarly be permitted to introduce evidence 
as to the character of the deceased victim . 
Similar judicial disapproval has been indicated towards any perceived over-
emphasis being placed by a sentencing judge upon the contents of a V.I.S. 
In Sargeant73 the sentencing judge had utilised lengthy passages of the 
victim impact reports verbatim in her sentencing remarks. Hammond J 
commented that although " .. to bring home to the offender what he had 
done" was a proper objective, "the extensive reading of the victim impact 
reports gave this sentencing a quite unbalanced aspect". 
Ashworth's views concur. He believes that the V.I.S. " .. might be expected 
to enhance the compensatory elements [of sentencing] , by making 
prosecutors and courts more aware of the need for compensation and by 
giving information about the harm and losses suffered .. ", but is less 
convinced about questions such as whether the V.I.S . should be permitted 
to contain a recommendation as to the sentence itself .
74 
B Reparation and Compensation 
1 Pragmatic considerations 
Research carried out during 1996 showed that reparation sentences were 
most frequently imposed when a victim had suffered property damage.
75 
This was the situation before the amendment of s 11 of the Criminal 
Justice Act. However, of the total number of property related offences 
during 1996 which resulted in a conviction, only 20% resulted in a sentence 
73 Above n 40. 
74 Above n 9, 504. 
75 Above n 7, 73. 
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of reparation. Violent offences were the next highest category, although the 
corresponding percentage of convictions resulting in a sentence of 
reparation was only 3%.7
6 These findings encouraged further investigation 
in order to address the specific question of the reasons for the non-use of 
reparation for property offences .
77 
Four District Courts were selected for survey and seven judges from those 
courts were interviewed. The main reason given by the judges for not 
imposing a sentence of reparation upon an offender convicted of a 
property-related offence was that the loss to the victim had already been 
made good. The other main reason was the inability of the offender to pay 
reparation. One judge commented that to make an award of partial 
reparation, where the award would be so low as to amount to a token 
reparation would be meaningless.
78 Another factor mentioned by some 
judges was that if the police did not raise the question of reparation then it 
would not be addressed by the sentencing court. 
2 Evaluation of emotional effects 
A 1989 survey of district probation offices found that reparation reports 
concerning emotional harm were less likely to be prepared than reparation 
reports concerning property loss and damage. The main reasons given for 
this were that emotional harm reparation reports were perceived by 
probation officers to be different entities from property loss and damage 
reports. In particular, the preparation of an emotional harm reparation 
report is considered to be complex and time-consuming and requires a 
victim/offender meeting. Furthermore, the judge usually does not specify 
an emotional harm report when requesting a reparation report. The 
76 Above n 53, 136. 
77 Above n 53, 141 . 
78 Above n 53, 151 . 
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difficulty of quantifying emotional loss was also mentioned as a 
discouraging factor.
79 
Reparation for emotional harm was considered in Sargeant v Police,
80 in 
which the victims were the family members of a person killed in a motor 
accident. Hammond J affirmed that the actual "loss" suffered by such a 
victim may be difficult to quantify, although " .. it has long been recognised 
that full compensation or reparation is not affordable, whether by society at 
large or individuals".
8 1 His Honour's view is supported by research which 
has shown that financial compensation is seen by the victim as moral 
vindication and symbolic; that it is evidence that the state acknowledges 
the victim's suffering and loss. If this is indeed the case, then precise 
quantification of the loss may not be relevant.
82 
3 Offender's lack of accountability 
All too often an order which was made against the defendant for reparation 
or a fine will, on default, be remitted or resentenced by a judge without 
consultation with the victim.
83 
Many victims mention difficulties with reparation payments being slow or 
not made at all. 8
4 "Once the heat of sentencing is over, the offender tends 
to lose his or her urgency to pay and the victims are left once again in a 
79 The ration was 7 4: 735 for the first three months of 1989. See B Galaway, P 
Spier above n 65, 94-98. 
80 Above n 40. 
81 Above n 40, 458. 
82 R L Mawby "Victims ' Needs or Victims Rights" in M Maguire and J Pointing (eds) 
Victims of Crime: a New Deal (Open University Press, Milton Keynes , 1988). 
83 C Henwood "A Judicial View of the Victim of Crime" in Seminar Proceedings The 
Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Past Progress and Future Plans (Victims 
Task Force, Wellington , 1992), 40. See also B Galaway, P Spier above n 65, 111. 
84 Above n 2, 16. 
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powerless situation ... ".85 Zehr contends that the reason for this might be 
that the sentence is viewed by the offender as one more punitive sanction, 
rather than as a logical attempt to right a wrong and fulfil an obligation to 
another person.86 Research in 1992 for the Ministry of Justice concluded 
that reparation is not being administered in a manner that would 
accomplish objectives relating to offender accountability or provide 
opportunities for victim participation.
87 
One of the justifications for truly restorative sentencing is accountability to 
the victim. However, the state v offender criminal justice process provides 
the state with the leading role in evaluating the extent of this accountability. 
Although accountability involves being given an opportunity to face up to 
the human consequences of one's behaviour and taking responsibility for 
the results of that behaviour,
88 in practice the offender's role is usually 
limited to providing details of his or her financial means to pay. 
Furthermore , the final decision as to the extent of a reparation sentence 
rests with the judge. A judge may request reparation reports and then not 
sentence an offender to reparation, even in situations where a victim and 
offender agreement is achieved.
89 
C 
1992 
The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
Issues raised by victims relating to the Accident Compensation Scheme 
include the inadequacy of the payments, particularly since the 1992 Act's 
85 C Henwood above n 83. 
86 H Zehr Changing Lenses (Herald Press, Pennsylvania, 1990) 42. 
87 Above n 65, 33. 
88 Above n 86. 
89 B Galaway, P Spier above n 65, 103. 
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replacement of the ability to receive a lump sum payments with an 
"independence allowance", the practical difficulties experienced in receiving 
an allowance under the Act, and the failure of the Act to provide 
compensation for victims without physical injury who suffer from stress or 
emotional harm other than that caused by sexual offences,
90 or for families 
of victims and secondary victims.
91 
Furthermore, the decision-making process under the Accident 
Compensation Scheme is one-way. The Scheme itself prescribes who is 
eligible and what compensation is payable . The actual harm suffered by 
individual victims and their needs is addressed only insofar as they meet 
the criteria laid down within the Scheme.
92 
D Civil Proceedings 
The main deterrents to victims bringing civil proceedings against the 
offender are the expense, the additional stress and the time involved. The 
victim will be required to recount details of the offence for a second time in 
formal court proceedings, and the psychological trauma caused by their 
participation in further adversarial legal proceedings might outweigh any 
benefits from the formal recognition of their plight by the court and the 
payment of damages.
93 Furthermore, this is likely to cause delay in the 
ability of the victim to "put the offence behind them" and is considered by 
some writers to be a form of re-victimization. 
90 Above n 2, 18. See also A Hayden ''There is Light at the End of the Tunnel": 
Initiatives for Victims of Crime at a Local, National and Statutory Level (Report to 
the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust Board , Wellington, 1996) 56. 
9 1 Above n 2, 19. 
92 J Shapland "Victim Assistance and the Criminal Justice System" in EA Fattah 
(ed) From Crime Policy to Victim Policy: Reorienting the Justice System (The 
Macmillan Press, Hampshire, 1986) 224. 
93 Above n 57 , 3. 
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One of the justifications for introducing the sentence of compensation in 
the United Kingdom was that it was unreasonable to expect most crime 
victims to pursue claims for damages through the civil courts.
94 However, 
although the awards of reparation and compensation might be considered, 
logically, to supersede any requirement for victims to expend time and 
resources upon pursuing a civil action, in practice this is not the case. In 
particular, an order for compensation must be deducted from any damages 
awarded in the civil courts, while an order for reparation "may make it 
more difficult to obtain damages in civil proceedings".
95 Furthermore, the 
compensation order is not available for more serious offences. 
E Summary 
The foregoing collation of criticisms made by victims and victims' 
organisations concerning the "accountability provisions" fails to reveal a 
single common thread. However, in brief: 
• a victim impact statement apprises the judge of the emotional and 
physical damage, and any material loss suffered by a victim, but fails to 
offer the victim any participatory role; 
• sentences of reparation, restitution and compensation , and also 
compensation payable under the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1992, address directly the material loss of the victim, 
but rarely address emotional damage, and also fail to offer a 
participatory role to the victim; 
94 Advisory Council on the Penal System Reparation by the Offender (Widgery 
Report , HMSO, 1970) and Lord Dunpark Reparation by the Offender to the Victim 
in Scotland (Edinburgh , HMSO 1977) Cmnd 6802, cited in Zedner above n 13, 239. 
95 Above n 53, 152. 
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• civil proceedings offer, indeed demand participation by the victim, but 
the need to bring additional court proceedings involves additional 
expense, time and stress for the victim . 
The question must be asked whether a more actively participatory role for 
victims in the sentencing process would in fact address these diverse 
criticisms with any degree of effectiveness. Furthermore, would the end 
result of such participation be compatible with the principle underlying the 
sentencing policy of the state v offender criminal justice process?
96 
V ENHANCED VICTIM 
SENTENCING 
PROCESS 
WITHIN THE 
PARTICIPATION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The premise common to most researchers in the area of victim involvement 
in the criminal justice system is that , presently, victims feel excluded from 
the process and that , accordingly, an opportunity to increase victim 
participation will increase victim satisfaction .
97 It is thought that an 
overriding motivation for many victims " .. is the desire to tell one's story and 
through doing this, to secure vindication .. .. ".
98 However, there is judicial 
opposition to any suggestion that a victim of an offence be asked to 
suggest or propose a punishment for the offender.
99 
Nevertheless, in its 1997 discussion paper on sentencing , the Ministry of 
Justice sees as "most significant" the issue whether victim 's needs would 
be better addressed by allowing them to address the court on sentencing , 
96 Discussed above part II B. 
97 Above n 42 . 
98 Above n 42, 17. See also E Erez and L Roeger above n 63, 48 . 
99 See, for example , R v B Unreported, 14 June 1989, High Court , Dunedin 
Registry, S8/89 and R v Hopkirk (1994) 12 CRNZ 21 6. 
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or to give an opinion on appropriate sentencing within the victim impact 
statement. 100 However, the Ministry itself notes several objections to the 
issue. 101 These include such matters as the probable inconsistencies of 
sentencing which would follow, 
102 the possibility of intimidation of , or 
retaliation against victims by offenders, and, finally and perhaps most 
persuasively to traditionalists, the fact that the victim would thereby be 
usurping the role of the state within the criminal justice process . 
Similarly, Ashworth is less confident about the relevance of a victim impact 
statement to aspects of sentencing other than compensatory sentencing , 
103 
for the reasons, respectively, that this would involve sentencing for 
unforeseen results (thus introducing subjectivity into sentencing , depending 
upon the particular susceptibilities of the victim) , that the defendant's rights 
might be infringed (the V.I.S. might permit unfounded allegations to be 
made about the offender), and finally that the ability to influence sentencing 
might raise expectations for victims which might subsequently not be met. 
Each of the foregoing arguments will be examined in turn. 
A Retaliatory Sentencing 
The proposition that a victim should be offered the opportunity to express 
his or her views concerning the sentencing of an offender inevitably raises 
the issue of retribution or retaliatory sentencing , due to the victim's 
100 Above n 7, 129. 
101 Above n 7, 125. 
102 See also E Crowther "The Impact of Impact Statements" [ 1998] NLJ 70. 
103 Above n 9, 505 - 508. 
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subjective viewpoint. 1
04 However, this belief is not supported by 
research. 105 Dr Howard Zehr writes: 
106 
Victims badly need what might be ca lled somewhat ambiguously ''an 
experience ofjustice". This has man y dimensions. Often it is assumed 
that vengeance is part of this need but va rious studies suggest that this 
is not necessa rily so, that the need for ve ngea nce often may be the 
result of justice denied . 
English research affirms that the "hanging, drawing and quartering" victim 
is a myth. Victims have been found not to be particularly punitive either in 
voicing their opinions about a sentence they would wish the offender to 
receive, or in their reactions to the sentences that those offenders who 
were convicted eventually received.
107 
B Unforeseen Consequences 
The introduction into the sentencing process of subjective matters such as 
the particular characteristics of a victim is considered to be wrong in that it 
will lead to arbitrariness , which is contrary to the requirement of the criminal 
justice process for proportionality in sentencing . 
However, the whole question of the unforeseeability of the consequences 
of a criminal act upon a victim needs to be examined objectively. Where 
the victim is known to the offender this argument collapses, unless the 
defendant has some mental or physical impairment which would prevent 
him or her from appreciating the particular characteristics of the victim. 
Where the victim is not known to the offender, it is suggested that the 
104 Above n 11 , 179. 
105 Above n 7, 130. 
106 H Zehr "Rethinking Criminal Justice: Restorative Justice" in McElrea (ed) above 
n 20, 4. 
107 J Shapland "Victims and the Criminal Justice System" in E A Fattah (ed) above 
n92,214. 
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nature of the crime itself will often raise a presumption of forseeability of its 
consequences for the victim. Furthermore, the victim will often plead his or 
her special circumstances at the time of the offence.
108 
in addition, there seems to be no reason why the "egg-shell skull" principle 
should not be permitted to apply after the offence as well as during the 
commission of the offence. In other words, the maxim that the offender 
must "take his victim as he finds him" should apply throughout the 
. d . t 109 prosecution an sentencing s ages. 
C Inconsistencies in Sentencing 
In its 1997 paper, the Ministry of Justice rebuts its own argument regarding 
inconsistencies of sentencing .
110 It explains that, although some guidance 
as to sentencing in New Zealand is provided by legislation and judicial 
rulings, a lack of specificity and the retention of judicial discretion mean 
that in practice a wide disparity in sentencing decisions is evident. A similar 
situation was observed in Canada by the Ontario Sentencing Project which 
carried out extensive research into the sentencing process in Ontario 
district courts. 11 1 The research led the Director of the Centre of Criminology 
at the University of Toronto to conclude that the sentencing process is 
fundamentally " .. a value judgement", in that " .. . such dispositions are 
accounted for more adequately by the beliefs and goals of the decision 
maker than by the objective facets of the individual case".
112 These findings 
support the view that to allow the victim to participate in the sentencing 
process will not be disturbing a rigid or consistent regime . On the contrary, 
108 H Fenwick "Procedural 'Rights ' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of 
the Criminal Justice Process?" (1997) 60 The Modern Law Review 317, 330. 
109 Above n 108. 
110 Above n 7, 35. 
111 See Report of Proceedings: National Conference on the Disposition of Offenders 
in Canada (Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, May 14-17, 1972) 11 . 
112 Above n 111 , 21 . 
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the "beliefs and goals" of the victim might simply be regarded as 
constituting another viewpoint (indeed the viewpoint of the person arguably 
most affected by the offence), and may contribute to "real" justice by 
increasing accuracy at the sentencing stage.
113 
D Offender Retaliation 
The possibility of victim intimidation or retaliation by offenders is more 
persuasive, especially where the offender and victim were already known 
to one another at the time of the offence. One possibility is that the views of 
the victim could be given to the sentencing judge as written submissions. 
However, this is likely to lead to similar criticisms from victims as are made 
concerning the submission of a written V.I.S. 
Nevertheless, it is not suggested that existing sentencing principles and 
guidelines be abolished. The victim's views would be influential only within 
the principles and guidelines already established for the particular category 
of offence. One writer suggests that there be a single maximum quantum 
for an offence; if the victim demanded less for private reparation, more 
would be owed to the community in the order for public reparation.
114 By 
thus removing any direct responsibility for the sentence from the victim, this 
might also overcome any perceptions that victim sentencing might lead to 
offender retaliation. 
E Conflict with the State v Offender Paradigm 
It is the argument concerning the usurpation of the role of the state which 
may be more compelling . Nevertheless, at certain stages within the 
criminal justice process , a divergence from the state v offender paradigm is 
113 See E Erez above n 25, 23. 
114 M Wright "Can Mediation be an Alternat ive to Criminal Justice?" in J Hudson, B 
Galaway {eds) above n 14, 236. 
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already apparent. A 1994 University of Bristol study of the police response 
to assault concluded that the "offence against society" model is not 
followed during the first stage of the criminal justice process. 
115 The 
authors noted that the police regularly choose not to proceed with a 
complaint from a victim of an assault if that victim does not demonstrate a 
firm commitment to the prosecution process. They inferred that the early 
stage of the criminal justice process follows a "complaint-orientated model", 
in which the interests of the state and society are subordinated to the 
interests and attitude of the victim in determining whether or not a 
complaint will proceed to prosecution.
116 Only rarely were the police 
prepared to bring charges against an alleged assailant without first 
ensuring the co-operation of the victim. The authors noted that in these 
"atypical" cases the police appeared to have been influenced by pragmatic 
considerations such as " .. the horrific nature of the injuries sustained , by the 
high profile which was afforded to these assaults in the local press, and 
...... by their wish to 'nail ' powerful local villains".
117 Patently, these were 
cases which would result in successful prosecution without necessarily 
requiring the co-operation of the victim . 
A further inconsistency with the state v offender paradigm becomes evident 
if the matter proceeds to prosecution and the defendant disputes the 
charge: 118 
Tf the defendant pl eads guilty they [the victim] are. in effect rendered 
redundant. If, on the other hand, the alleged a. sa ilant contests the 
charge, the victim may be subjected to a gruelling examinati on of his 
or her own behaviour, all in the interes ts of a process which has 
large ly publi c, or symbolic, purposes. 
These views are affirmed by research which analyses the framework within 
which the criminal justice system operates in the United Kingdom.
119 This 
115 Above n 36. 
116 Above n 36, 16. 
117 Above n 36, 21. 
118 Above n 36, 15. 
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concluded that the ostensible, formal requirements of the criminal law 
model are indeed addressed in the criminal justice system " .... with the 
rhetoric of these principles .. " However the research observes the significant 
gap between rhetoric and reality which exists in practice and which is 
exemplified by such human variables as coercive police practice, the 
decision to prosecute a particular offence, and the broad judicial discretion, 
and hence subjectivity, in sentencing decisions. 
120 
It is concluded that at certain points the criminal justice process already 
diverges significantly from the state v offender paradigm. A logical point for 
further divergence from the paradigm might be at the commencement of 
the sentencing process. 
F Unfairness 
Another argument against victim participation in sentencing is the inherent 
unfairness of purely restitutional sentencing (which research indicates most 
victims will seek) , 121 in that a wealthier offender will generally suffer less 
hardship when required to compensate their victim than the poorer 
offender. The argument is refuted by noting that the financial means of an 
offender has of necessity always been one factor considered by the court 
when imposing a sentence. A pragmatic view suggests that restitutional 
sentencing be looked at in a wider sense than purely financial. Thus, the 
impecunious offender might compensate his or her victim by offering 
services. 
11 9 C M King The Framework of Criminal Justice (Croom Helm Ltd , London, 1981 ). 
See also J Shapland above n 107,215. 
12° CM King above n 119, 149. 
121 J Shapland, J Willmore , P Duff Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Gower 
Publishing, Great Britain , 1985) 135. 
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G Subjective Arguments 
Other researchers suggest that by making the victim of a crime responsible 
for the imposition of a punishment, the victim's capacity to "walk away 
from" the crime may be negatively affected , 122 and point out that if the 
sentencing judge (who, it is presumed, will retain a discretion) after 
listening to the offender's plea in mitigation , does not follow the victim's 
wishes concerning sentencing , the victim might well feel more let down 
than if their views had not been sought in the first place . These arguments 
are rather more subjective. No doubt some victims will be so affected , 
others will not. In any event "[t]he victim 's presence and participation in 
court proceedings .... remind judges, juries and prosecutors that behind the 
"state" is a real person with an interest in how the case is resolved".
123 
The foregoing analysis suggests that there are persuasive arguments for 
permitting victims to assume a more actively participatory role in the 
sentencing process. The specific nature of that participation and whether it 
would result in outcomes which meet the requirements of the sentencing 
policies of the state v offender criminal justice paradigm 
124 have yet to be 
considered . Accordingly, the following part of this paper considers these 
questions and suggests affording victims enforceable rights in the criminal 
justice process in order that they may participate in the sentencing process . 
122 Halleck SL "Vengeance and Victimisation" (1980) Victimology v 5. 
123 See E Erez above n 25, 23. 
124 Discussed above part II B. 
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VI LEGISLATIVE PROVISION FOR VICTIMS' RIGHTS 
WITHIN SENTENCING 
A Rights for Victims 
Cellini observes that " .. nothing short of a constitutional amendment 
delineating victims' rights and giving them standing to assert these rights in 
criminal proceedings would be sufficient to ensure victims a role in the 
criminal justice system". 12
5 
The criminal justice process itself focuses upon two protagonists, the state 
and the offender. Legally enforceable rights are not provided for peripheral 
participants in the process such as victims . There is, for example, no 
equivalent for the victim of the procedural rights contained in the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 which allow the offender to present their circumstances 
for consideration in pre-sentence reports, and also to call witnesses 
concerning their cultural background and its effect upon the offending.
126 
The Victims of Offences Act consists mainly of principles concerning 
services which victims should be entitled to receive , and also recommends 
that the views on bail of victims of sexual or assault offences be conveyed 
to the judge. 127 The provisions concerning victim impact statements are 
also recommendatory in form.
128 Thus, for example although a victim 
impact statement should be taken into account by the judge at sentencing , 
it would clearly be difficult for a victim to be sure that it had been. The Act 
125 Above n 4, 864. 
126 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 16. 
127 Victims of Offences Act 1987, ss 8, 10. 
128 The Act was passed in order to comply with New Zealand's international 
obligations , for example, the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (November 1985) which is binding 
on New Zealand. 
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contains no sanctions for a failure to observe any of its declared principles, 
although the Law Commission has recently recommended that victims' 
interests within the Act be elevated to the level of rights. 
129 The non-legal 
status of the Victims Charter in England has drawn similar criticism, 
because " .. the persuasive grace and favour nature of this approach may 
eventually become unsustainable especially if the political climate grows 
more hostile to victims rights". 130 
Furthermore, although many of the responsibilities owed by the criminal 
justice system to the person charged with an offence have been elevated 
to the status of rights within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
131 no 
such equivalent legislation exists to affirm the "rights" of the victim of a 
crime. Admittedly, certain of these rights such as the right of a person 
charged with an offence to be tried without undue delay1
32 are beneficial to 
both the accused and the victim. Conversely, however, in bail applications 
a balancing exercise is required between the responsibilities owed to the 
victim and those owed to the person charged with the offence.
133 In any 
event, there is no legislation which would permit a victim to enforce those 
putative "rights". 
A similar situation exists in the United States. The rights of a person 
charged with an offence are constitutionally guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights, 134 while the victim is not mentioned. Cellini
135 explains this anomaly 
129 New Zealand Law Commission above n 5, 127. 
130 Above n 108, 324. 
131 See ss 21 - 27. 
132 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(b). See also Martin v District Court at 
Tauranga [1995] 1 NZLR 491 , and New Zealand Law Commission above n 5, 80. 
133 See for example the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 24(b) which requires 
that the accused be released on bail unless there is just cause for continued 
detention. The necessary 'balancing exercise' was discussed by Eichelbaum CJ in 
Whitair v Attorney-General [1996] 2 NZLR 45. 
134 US Constitution amend. IV, V. 
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as reflecting the historical situation at the time of drafting of the Bill of 
Rights. The accused was often "mistreated and abused under the authority 
of the Crown". On the other hand, a victim was, at that time, able to bring a 
private criminal prosecution and damages were a principal goal of the 
criminal proceeding . Therefore , "the Founding Fathers would not have felt 
a need to delineate a victim 's right to attend and participate in a crim inal 
proceeding when the victim could have almost complete charge of the 
prosecution of one accused of causing him injury". 
Word limitations prevent a detailed investigation within this paper of the 
background to the criminal procedure provisions of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. However, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was drawn 
heavily from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which does not 
mention rights for victims, yet affirms rights for a person charged with a 
criminal offence. It is conceivable, therefore , that in a parallel with the 
postulated development of the United States' Bill of Rights, the position of 
the victim was simply overlooked by the drafters of the New Zealand 
legislation , rather than representing a deliberate policy decision . 
Fenwick discusses the concept of victims' rights as being one side of a 
bargain between the state and victims . As the burden of offence avoidance 
or crime prevention is taken on more and more by private citizens (who 
finance or volunteer for entities such as security guards or Neighbourhood 
Watch schemes), who are also potential victims of crime , so actual victims 
of crime should have the right to ensure that punishment of the offender 
occurs if offence avoidance fails.
136 However, her objection to this concept 
is that, logically, the victim who has not accepted responsibility for offence 
avoidance (such as the car owner who has left her car unlocked, or the 
135 Above n 4, 846. 
136 Above n 108, 320. 
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rape victim who has walked along a dark street late at night), would then 
not be entitled to the right to participate in sentencing. 
137 
Alternatively, Fenwick sees the provision of victims' rights as being 
necessary to prevent secondary victimisation. 138
 This view accords more 
with the concept of victims assuming a participatory role in the criminal 
justice process. 
B Are Rights for Victims Compatible with the Criminal 
Justice Process? 
Nevertheless, if victims are given a legally enforceable right to participate in 
sentencing, various procedural and practicable difficulties become 
apparent. For instance, would an offender have a right to appeal a 
sentence on the grounds that his victim had chosen not to make 
representation? Statements made by a victim in person at the sentencing 
hearing would be cross-examinable by prosecuting counsel. This would 
cause additional stress for victims and could lead to objections of re-
victimisation, in the same way as already occurs when victims bring civil 
proceedings for exemplary damages. 
Furthermore, it is debatable whether such legislation would supply the 
"sense of participation" which is extremely important to victims. The formal 
procedures and adversarial approach of the criminal justice process are 
designed to minimise the emotional elements of criminal justice. It is 
unlikely, within such a setting, that the offender would feel able to express 
his or her remorse with any sincerity, and similarly, the victim might feel 
constrained from revealing the full extent of his or her reaction to the 
137 Above n 108, 320. 
138 Above n 108, 320. 
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offending. Certainly, the current attitude of the judiciary to any suggestion 
of emotive language within a written V.I.S. does not encourage optimism 
concerning possible emotional outbursts from the victim in the sentencing 
court. 139 
Perhaps the main objection is that participation by victims within that 
process is likely to result in sentencing decisions which are not consistent 
with the sentencing principles of the criminal justice process. Thus although 
victims seek active participation within the process, 
140 it appears that from 
that participation they hope to achieve results such as reparation , the 
redress of the wrong , emotional healing , reassurance concerning safety 
from the offender and the rehabilitation of the offender.
141 These aims 
diverge considerably from the aims of the sentencing policies within the 
criminal justice process. 
It is concluded , therefore , that if victims' rights of participation are to be 
permitted have a real impact upon sentencing , then the criminal justice 
process itself will require to be re-shaped in a fundamental sense. The 
sentencing policies which underpin the present state v offender model will 
no longer be applicable . Alternatively, victims rights of participation will be 
illusory. The sentencing judge will pay lip-service to the views of victims, 
but will, in the end, sentence the offender in accordance with the 
retributive, deterrent and proportionality aims of sentencing which are the 
foundation of sentencing in the criminal justice process . 
139 See R v Hopkirk, above n 67. 
140 Above n 2, 33. 
141 Above n 2, 45. 
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The New Zealand Law Commission supports increased participation by 
victims in the criminal justice process, including the sentencing process.
142 
Conversely, however, Victim Support opposes the imposition upon victims 
of a " ... burden regarding decisions about the offender".
143 In order to 
assess the reality and the extent of victims' wishes so far as participation in 
sentencing is concerned, specific opportunities for such participation which 
are already provided for victims in other jurisdictions are examined briefly. 
Such opportunities have in many instances not been taken advantage of by 
victims to the extent that would be expected. Furthermore, it appears that 
victims' level of satisfaction with the criminal justice service may not have 
been improved to a significant extent by affording them such 
· · 144 opportun1t1es. 
C A Victim's Right of A/locution 
In some American states, rights of allocution are provided for victims. This 
right permits the victim to present a victim impact statement (V.I.S.) orally 
to the sentencing court. 14
5 However, this does not lead inevitably to victim 
participation in sentence, since in theory the victim's statement could be 
disregarded. 146 Although the Kansas Court of Appeals in State v Heath
147 
approved a victim's explicit sentencing request which did not follow state 
sentencing guidelines for the particular offence, the degree of influence of 
a V.I.S. upon sentencing differs from state to state.
148 
142See Law Commission above n 5, 85. 
143 Hayden, above n 90. 
144 Above n 108, 321 . 
145 Above n 11,161. 
146 Above n 108, 329 . 
147 901 P 2d 29 (Kan Ct App 1996). 
148 Payne v Tennessee 112 L Ed 2d 1032, 111 S Ct 1407 (1991 ), discussed in E A 
Meek "Victim Impact Evidence and Capital Sentencing: A Casenote on Payne v 
Tennessee" (1992) 52 Louisiana Law Review 1299; South Carolina v Gathers 104 
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Judges in the United States formerly possessed the discretionary power to 
exclude victims who would be likely to testify at a subsequent hearing from 
the substantive trial of the accused. This discretionary power was thought 
to be a necessary safeguard to prevent prejudice and prejudgment of the 
issues. However this discretion has now been expressly excluded by the 
United States Victim Allocution Clarification Act 1997. The legislation 
provides that " .. a United States district court shall not order any victim of an 
offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that offense 
because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the 
effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family". 
Despite the foregoing judicial and legislative encouragements, there 
remains some doubt concerning whether or not victims in fact wish to take 
advantage of a right of al locution. The research of Davis and Smith 
149 
which established that the V.I.S. procedure did not enhance victim 
satisfaction with the criminal justice process, led them to question whether 
allowing victims to make oral statements to the court at sentencing " .. might 
offer a more effective way to promote victim satisfaction through 
participation". 150 However, they note that a study carried out into the effects 
of a Californian allocution statute revealed that although victims who spoke 
in court were positive about the experience, they were no more satisfied 
with the criminal justice process than were those victims who chose not to 
speak. The researchers conclude that the premise that victims desire 
participation within the criminal justice process may be flawed. They 
recommend the instigation of further research in order to ascertain, first, 
L Ed 2d 876, 109 S Ct 2207, (1989), and Booth v Maryland 96 L Ed 2d 440, 107 S 
Ct 2529 (1987), overrruled. See also Ministry of Justice above n 7, 127. 
149 RC Davis, BE Smith "Victim Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction: An 
Unfulfilled Promise?" [1994] 22 Journal of Criminal Justice 1. 
150 Above n 149, 11. 
--+7-
the proportion of victims who want to participate more fully in the criminal 
justice process and, second, to determine who these victims are . Although 
the answers to these questions " .. might not be compatible with the aims of 
the justice system and the rights of the accused, .. .. . until we understand 
what victims want , we cannot debate their role in the justice process 
intelligently." 15 1 
One explanation for the apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of victims 
observed by Davis and Smith, 
152 might be that al locution is not truly 
participatory. For victims to participate with any degree of satisfaction in the 
sentencing process they might also require to be given the legally 
enforceable right to question the offender and any witnesses, to compel 
prosecution and to challenge the sentence imposed on the offender. 
Police prosecutors in Australia observe that in general the circumstances of 
the offender are examined in more detail by the sentencing judge than the 
circumstances of the victim. The reasons suggested for this are because 
either there is a solicitor representing the defendant, or there exists a pre-
sentence report "that goes into great detail about how the sentence will 
affect the offender". 153 Although the V.1.S. is intended to countermand this 
effect to some extent, another possibility might be that the victim be 
represented by legal counsel. Section 4 of the Victims of Offences Act 
1987 states that "Victims ... should have access to ...... legal assistance 
responsive to their needs." While expressing support for the concept, the 
Victims' Task Force has also noted the resource implications of making this 
provision mandatory rather than recommendatory . However it has been 
noted that legal aid is available for the legal representation of impecunious 
151 Above n 149, 12. 
152 Above n 149, 129. 
153 Above n 63, 9. 
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offenders and should therefore also be made available for impecunious 
victims. 154 
Although the provision of legal counsel for victims at sentencing might 
increase victims' sense of participation in the criminal justice process , the 
difficulty of reconciling the sentencing aims of victims with those of the 
state v offender criminal justice paradigm remains . In order to address the 
wishes of victims effectively, it may be necessary to minimise the role of 
the state in the criminal justice process and return the conflict to the 
individuals concerned .155 A victim v offender restorative justice paradigm , 
which would come into operation after a finding or plea of guilty, offers the 
opportunity " ... for victims and offenders to reach agreements as to the 
appropriate response to the offending , sometimes under the umbrella of 
court processes, and sometimes in an independent process". 
156 
VII PARTICIPATION WITHIN A NEW PARADIGM OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 
In supporting the claims of victims for a voice in the criminal justice 
process, Jamieson 157 proposes "a major paradigm shift to a fully restorative 
justice system". This view is supported by Shapland
158 who observes that 
the adoption of a more victim-centered system within the criminal justice 
process may produce ".a system more rounded in its concerns but no less 
adversarial than at present". She postulates the emergence of a different 
model , one closer to a "mediated consensus model of dispute resolution". 
154 A Hayden above n 90, 87. 
155 See text at n 36. 
156 Above n 7, 128. 
157 Above n 20, 7. 
158 Above n 107, 216. 
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The leading criminologist, Nils Christie, claims that the takeover of the 
crime conflict by the state and its professionals is theft of important public 
property. 159 The victim, the offender, and the community must regain "their" 
conflict from the state. In order to achieve this ideal , society's expectations 
of the criminal justice process need to be addressed. The modern concept 
of retribution as the focus of justice should be replaced by the traditional 
restorative concepts of accepting responsibility, and restitution.
160 
Nevertheless, it will generally be appropriate for the criminal justice process 
to operate until a guilty verdict is obtained (or pleaded) .
16 1 This disposes of 
the objection that the possibility of an early diversion out of the system 
might induce some defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid a public 
trial. 162 
The need for "redress of the wrong" is already acknowledged to a limited 
extent within the criminal justice process. Reparative sentencing is 
available under the Criminal Justice Act 1985
163 and the Children , Young 
Persons and their Families Act 1989 has replaced court proceedings in the 
area of youth justice with family conferences.
164 There are also a few adult 
restorative justice schemes such as "Te Oritenga" and "Justice 
Alternatives" in Auckland, and the pilot project run by Timaru District 
Court. 165 However, these initiatives have been less successful than 
159 Above n 27. 
160 H Zehr "Models of Justice - Retribution vs Restoration" (1994) 420 Lawtalk 18. 
161 See Submission No 32 , New Zealand Council of Victim Support Groups 
Restorative Justice: The Public Submissions (Ministry of Justice, Wellington , 1998). 
162 G Davis above n 5, 139. 
163 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 11 , 12, 14, 16, 22- 25, 28 - 45. 
164 Children , Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, s 279. 
165 "Perfect Justice or Easy Way Out?" Sunday Star-Times, Auckland . New 
Zealand, 19 April 1998, C6. 
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envisaged .166 It is suggested that this might be because of the inherent 
difference between the restorative justice paradigm, which views crime as 
a conflict between individuals, resulting in harm to victims, communities, 
and offenders, and the criminal justice process which views crime as a 
conflict between the offender and the state. 167 with the true victim treated 
as no more than another witness to assist the prosecution. 
A restorative justice scheme is one which possesses the following 
characteristics and objectives: the rehabilitation of offenders , the active 
participation of victims, the redress of the wrong, the affirmation of 
community and cultural values, and the restoration of community 
relationships through "reintegrative shaming" of the offender. 
168 
In brief, 
restorative justice recognises that the conflict is between individuals and 
encourages dialogue and healing.
169 
Zedner maintains that restorative aims in sentencing appear to conflict with 
the state v offender criminal justice process, for three reasons. 
17° First, 
restorative justice 171 has no intrinsic penal character and thus ignores the 
166 Ministry of Justice Restorative Justice: A Discussion Paper (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington, 1995) 34. 
167 J Hudson, B Galaway above n 14, 2; H Zehr above n 14, 82. See also 
Submission No 73, Dunstall Restorative Justice: The Public Submissions (Ministry 
of Justice, Wellington , 1998) . 
168 The principle of reintegative shaming is that although the offender may be 
stigmatized for the offence he or she is provided with ways to overcome that 
stigmatization. See J Braithwaite Crime Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge 
University Press , Cambridge, 1989). 
169 Above n 159. 
170 Above n 13, 239. 
171 Note that Zedner's chosen terminology is the converse of that selected by the 
Department of Justice, above n 7, 70. In other words , Zedner uses the term 
"reparative justice" to include compensation as well as wider elements such as 
acknowledgement of the harm done , expressions of remorse and agreement to 
undergo rehabilitative treatment. This form of justice is described as "restorative 
justice" by the Department of Justice, while the concept of reparation is used to 
mean financial compensation . 
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distinction between criminal law and civil law. 172 Second, restorative justice 
fails to recognise that a crime is not simply an offence against the victim, 
but also an offence against society. Because restorative justice 
proceedings are not generally open to either the public , or the media , the 
element of public denunciation of the offender is missing . Third, restorative 
justice focuses upon the harm caused by the offence and ignores the mens 
rea element of the crime. The effect of the crime upon the particular victim 
is considered, but the degree of culpability of the offender is not. 
These arguments are refutable to an extent. First , there is no inherent 
reason why restorative outcomes should not contain a punitive element, 
(although research indicates that victims are not inclined to be overly 
punitive). 173 Second, outcomes such as community service orders are 
intended to acknowledge the interest of the wider community in the 
outcome of a criminal prosecution. Third, the outcome of a restorative 
justice process is one which will have been negotiated and agreed between 
the offender and victim themselves. It is unlikely that the matter of the 
offender's intent will not have been discussed and taken into account when 
reaching agreement. 
However, the recent decision by the Court of Appeal in R v Clotworth/
74 
has highlighted the resistance evidenced by, not only the public
175 
but also 
the judiciary in accepting restorative justice sentencing agreements as 
being "legitimate" outcomes of the criminal justice process. In Clotworthy 
the final recommendation of a restorative justice conference , endorsed by 
both offender and victim, was appealed by the solicitor-general 's office as 
being inappropriate for a case of serious offending. The victim was 
172Discussed above part II. 
173 Discussed above part V A. 
174 Unreported , 29 June 1998, Court of Appeal , CA 114/98. 
175 See F Haden Sunday Star -Times New Zealand,5 July 1998, C4. 
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permitted to speak at the appeal hearing and reiterated his agreement with 
the original restorative sentence and also his view that a prison sentence 
would achieve nothing either for the offender or himself. 
176 Nevertheless, 
observing that the need to deter others for public safety reasons was too 
important to justify the imposition of a suspended prison sentence, the 
Court of Appeal overturned the earlier ruling and imposed a prison 
sentence of three years upon the offender. 
Although the decision in Clotworthy appears to focus upon an irreconcilable 
conflict between the interests of the state and the interests of the victim, 
this is not necessarily the case . One of the outcomes of restorative justice 
must be the assurance of the safety and security of the wider community. 
Therefore depending upon the nature of the offending , incarceration of the 
offender may be a legitimate sentencing aim which, if improperly 
overlooked by the parties at a restorative justice conference , may be 
examined by the court. Nevertheless, the wishes of the victim should be 
influential, 177 and it is only if the offender poses a threat in reality that the 
court should be permitted to intervene. Contrary to the situation in the 
criminal justice process, there is no place within restorative justice for 
taking a symbolic view of the interests of the state . 
178 
Restorative justice in New Zealand operates principally in the area of youth 
justice where it has, in effect, replaced the criminal justice process . The 
family group conference (FGC) system is a compulsory restorative justice 
scheme which operates in the youth justice area for all offences except 
murder and manslaughter.179 One of the principles of the scheme is that 
the interests of victims of youth offending should be given due regard when 
176 Above n 174, 12. 
177 See text at n 35. 
178 G Davis above n 5, 217. 
179 The fam ily group conference system was established by the Children, Young 
Persons and their Families Act 1979. 
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dealing with that offending. Victims are invited to attend and to participate 
in the FGC and offenders are encouraged to accept responsibility for the 
wrong done to the victim and to make amends. Victims are generally 
positive about the experience of meeting the offender, and being enabled 
to "release" negative feelings about the offending, although some mention 
intimidation by the offender and an inability to express their true feelings 
concerning the offence for various reasons. 180 However, research indicates 
a significant level of victim dissatisfaction with the system, mostly centered 
upon the perceived inadequacy of penalties or reparation, and 
dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative proposals made within the FGC for the 
offender. 181 Morris suggests that the underlying reason for victim 
dissatisfaction might be that " .. [t]ension has been created by expecting very 
different interests to be met in a single forum without one or the other being 
compromised". 182 However, she does not condemn the principles which 
underlie restorative justice. Rather, she suggests practical improvements to 
the process such as providing victims with support and information before 
meeting offenders and proposes that victim attendance should remain 
optional. 183 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The influence of the victims' movement with its demands for a leading role 
in the criminal justice system is a relatively recent phenomenon, but its 
rapid increase both nationally and internationally indicate that it will not be 
180 However recent amendments to the Children, Young Persons and their Families 
Act 1979 are intended to place a further "emphasis upon the victim" and are 
intended to reduce complaints of such intimidation. These relate to the new duty of 
the Youth Justice Co-ordinator to consult with the victim concerning the date and 
time of the FGC (s 250(2)); and also to s 251 (2) which allows a victim to be 
accompanied by support persons when attending an FGC. 
181 See above n 2 and see also D Swain "Family Group Conferences in Child Care 
and Protection and in Youth Justice in Aotearoa/New Zealand" International Journal 
of Law and the Family 9 (August 1995) 155-207. 
182 A Morris "Giving Victims a Voice: A New Zealand Experiment" [1993] 
Criminology Aotearoa/New Zealand 12. 
183 Above n 182, 13. 
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short-lived. Given the twin pressures of international opinion and political 
expediency, it seems inevitable that New Zealand's criminal justice system 
will be compelled to make provision for victims of crime to participate 
actively in the criminal process. 
This paper has examined the various ways in which the criminal justice 
process recognises the concept of accountability to victims in the 
sentencing process and has concluded that they are generally ineffectual in 
meeting the real needs of victims. Consideration of the provision of legally 
enforceable victims' rights which would enable a victim to make some form 
of "actively participatory" contribution reveals that viable victim participation 
in sentencing within the criminal justice paradigm remains illusory. The 
reason for this is that there is a fundamental conflict between the 
retributive, deterrent and proportionality aims of sentencing of the criminal 
justice process and the restorative and rehabilitative aims of victims. 
Although research indicates that restorative justice outcomes offer an 
increased level of victim satisfaction, these outcomes are inconsistent with 
the criminal justice process and therefore lack the capability to reach their 
full potential. 184 
One possible solution is to allow the criminal justice paradigm to proceed 
so far as the stage of sentencing, or to a plea of guilty. The punitive aims of 
sentencing under the criminal justice process 
185 would then be replaced by 
restorative aims, so far as is practicable and reconcilable with public safety 
issues. Accordingly, for more serious crimes, sentencing will take place 
under the criminal justice system, and restorative justice programmes will 
be offered subsequently. The aims of the restorative justice programmes in 
such cases will be the promotion of emotional healing and the rehabilitation 
of the offender, (although this would not preclude incarceration where this 
184 G Davis above n 5, 20-21. 
185 Above n 7, 40. 
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is deemed necessary for the protection of society). For other crimes, when 
"the defendant" has become "the offender", the restorative justice paradigm 
will replace criminal justice. In this way both the victim and the offender will 
"regain their conflict". 186 
186Above n 27. 
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